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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. What is a reasonable level for that threshold of court 
review of obscenity evidence which will assure protection of First 
Amendment Principles and yet permit the application of community 
standards by a jury? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals require an unnecessarily high 
preliminary threshold in this case? 
iv 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App., infra, 1) is 
sported at 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 47. The Circuit Courtfs March 28, 
989, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (App., infra, 2) from which 
he Respondent Turner sought permission to appeal resulted in an 
)rder from the Court of Appeals Denying Interlocutory Appeal (App., 
Infra, 3). The Judgment of the Circuit Court based on the verdict 
of a jury (App., infra, 4) was issued on September 25, 1989. 
JURISDICTION 
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on June 6, 
1991. (App. infra, 1) Rehearing was not requested. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Sec. 78-2-2(3)(a), Replacement Volume 9, 
1987 Ed., and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
v 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for redress of grievances." 
Article I, Sec. 15, of the Utah Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press . . . " 
St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2 provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
"a. "Obscene" is a word descriptive of any material or 
performance which, then taken as a whole and considered 
in the context of the contemporary standard of this 
community: 
(1) Appeals to the prurient interest in sex; 
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
manner; 
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value. 
* * * 
e. "Sexual conduct" includes any of the following 
described forms of sexual conduct if depicted or 
described in a patently offensive way: 
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory functions or lewd 
exhibition of the genitals, including any explicit 
close-up representation of a human genital organ or 




1. On March 28, 1989, trial judge David L. Mower denied 
ifendant's Motion to Dismiss, finding "sufficient question of fact 
3 to the existence of obscenity to submit the matter to a jury," 
tie Defendant, Brent Allen Turner, sought permission to appeal from 
he Interlocutory Order of the circuit court but was denied. Judge 
fower properly characterized his ruling as "pivotal", and this 
:ourt is now asked to review one of the same issues, the Court of 
Appeals after review of the evidence presented at trial having 
found favorably for Turner in a split decision. The issue directly 
addresses the degree to which a community is free to apply regional 
standards to obscenity questions, and the Court of Appeals has 
limited that local prerogative in a manner that conflicts with 
decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court. 
A. Threshold To Be Applied. Part (b) of the test given in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 
contains a substantive component that permits the court to check 
juror discretion ("whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law"). Jenkins v. Georgia. 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 
2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 at 650. (The majority opinion below indicates 
that the first prong of the Miller test is also subject to the same 
threshold, although the cases do not normally apply it to the 
pruriency requirement.) The trial judge made preliminary 
determination that the threshold had been met, and after hearing 
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the evidence, he denied Turner's motion for a directed verdict on 
the basis that the threshold continued to be met. What standard, 
if any, do we have to establish an appropriate threshold? 
Miller itself gives "a few plain examples" upon which courts 
can rely in applying the test formulated therein, and it is 
reasonable for the trial court to compare a particular instance of 
alleged obscenity with those examples, using them as a form of 
minimum criteria* In Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 
S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 at 619, the Court said: 
"While the particular descriptions there contained [in 
Miller] were not intended to be exhaustive, they clearly 
indicate that there is a limit beyond which neither 
legislative draftsmen nor juries may go in concluding 
that particular material is 'patently offensive1 within 
the meaning of the obscenity test set forth in the Miller 
cases." 
Miller is the standard. The "plain examples" include, of course, 
a "lewd exhibition of the genitals", two instances of which are 
alleged by Petitioner to appear on the painted bedsheet in 
question. This example or criteria from Miller would contradict 
the earlier case of Huffman v. United states, 470 F.2d 386 (1971), 
cited by the majority opinion below, which seems to hold that 
nudity alone can never be hardcore, even where "genitals are made 
the focal points of the pictures," and no matter how lewdly they 
may be displayed. 
The Miller test is applied as a two-step inquiry in U. S. v. 
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 2nd Cir., 
(1983) . As stated therein, the first step is to see whether the 
content of the materials "qualifies as possibly obscene"; in other 
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>rds, does it "depict or describe 'hardcore' types of sexual 
mduct that the trier of fact could constitutionally label 
patently offensive1". This first part of the Miller test is the 
hreshold in issue here. The second step, of course, is submission 
,o the jury for determination of whether the materials are patently 
>ffensive to the average person in the community, assuming the 
first step is answered affirmatively. The first step is to be 
distinguished from determination of whether the materials are 
ultimately in fact "obscene" or not. In one case the threshold was 
found by the court to have been met but the trier of fact found no 
obscenity (U. S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 
supra), while in another case the trial judge expressed an opinion 
that the materials were not obscene but nonetheless found correctly 
that the threshold had been met (State v. Lichon, 786 P.2d 1037 at 
1043 (Ariz. App. 1989). 
Although the case involves reliability of evidence and is 
clearly distinguishable from the case here, the court discusses 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1991) as dealing with the 
overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury. Unfortunately, 
this is of very limited help in determining the proper threshold 
for an obscenity case. "Where the line is drawn [between those 
matters entrusted to the finder of fact and those matters upon 
which the court must exercise its own independent judgment] varies 
according to the nature of the substantive law at issue." Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 
502 at 517. Cases involving First Amendment principles and mixed 
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questions of fact and law may require a higher threshold of 
constitutional scrutiny than matters involving the admission of 
evidence. To distinguish the role of the trial court in an 
obscenity case from that of the jury, we must still turn to the 
definition in Miller, and the courts do so in nearly every instance 
where obscenity is the issue. 
In the earlier case (1964) of Jacobellis v. Ohio,. 378 U.S. 
184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, Justice Brennan may have 
intended a somewhat higher threshold when he required "an 
independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to 
whether the material involved is constitutionally protected." 
Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark would limit 
themselves "to a consideration only of whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record upon which a finding of obscenity could be 
made", p. 806. They state: 
" * * * protection of society's right to maintain its 
moral fiber and the effective administration of justice 
require that this Court not establish itself as an 
ultimate censor, in each case reading the entire record, 
viewing the accused material, and making an independent 
de novo judgment on the question of obscenity. 
Therefore, once a finding of obscenity has been made 
below under a proper application of the Roth test, I 
would apply a 'sufficient evidence' standing of review -
requiring something more than merely any evidence but 
something less than 'substantial evidence on the record 
[including the allegedly obscene material] as a whole.' 
Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 
95 L.Ed. 456, 71 S.Ct. 456. This is the only reasonable 
way I can see to obviate the necessity of this Court's 
sitting as the Super Censor of all the obscenity purveyed 
throughout the Nation." 
Jacobellis was decided prior to Miller, wherein Justice Brennan 
dissented. As stated in Hamlina v. United States, supra, "any 
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stitutional principle enunciated in Miller which would serve to" 
iure First Amendment protections must be utilized by the trial 
Ige before an obscenity matter is referred to the jury. Whatever 
idance we have as to a threshold in obscenity cases must derive 
om the opinion in Miller. 
B. Threshold Here Not In Harmony With Miller. By 
stablishing too high a threshold, the decision of the Court of 
ppeals improperly applied the Miller test to the facts. The first 
wo elements of that test (prurience and patent offensiveness) 
ormed the primary basis for that courtfs review of the facts. 
Apparently addressing prurience, the primary subject of 
3rockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86 
L.Ed.2d 394, the Court of Appeals errs in seeking the response of 
one viewing the drawings rather than the intended effect of the 
drawings themselves. Miller merely requires that the work appeal 
to the prurient interest; the work must call out to, or be 
intended to try and stimulate, one's shameful or morbid interest. 
It would be illogical to actually require that it titillate or 
provoke a sexual response in the viewer, either normal or abnormal. 
As pointed out by F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity, at p. 102, a 
depiction that will arouse a prurient interest in one may arouse 
disgust in another. Indeed, to require the first prong of the 
Miller test to mean that the material must sexually excite the 
average person is to contradict the second prong which requires 
that material to be "offensive" to the average person. To have 
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prurient appeal the Turner depictions must clearly be sexual in 
nature, but they need not arouse. As stated in Ripplinger v. 
Collins, 868 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1989) the "Model Penal Code" of 
the American Law Institute "seems to focus on the quality or nature 
of the material itself rather than on its actual effect on anyone." 
That case rejects the argument that the prurient appeal branch of 
the Miller test could only be satisfied if the average person 
viewing the material would experience sexual arousal. It is "the 
capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look" that 
determines an intended appeal to prurient interests, and "whether 
or not the material is successful in doing so is beside the point." 
Otherwise, as the court points out, material that is the most 
offensive could not be found obscene because the average person 
would react to it with revulsion instead of arousal. 
The lower court argues that because the depictions are not 
artfully done and are vague in the accuracy of their detail, they 
cannot be patently offensive. No precedent decision could be found 
that addresses this concern, but a somewhat analogous situation may 
be found in City of Urbana ex rel. Newlin v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d 
140 (Ohio 1989), cert, den., 58 L.W. 3284, where material was found 
to be obscene even though genitals were obscured. The Ohio Supreme 
Court stated: 
"We hold that the industry practice of publishing 
photographs with a small black dot obscuring the actual 
contact between sexual organs and various orifices does 
not preclude a jury from finding representations of 
ultimate sexual acts or display of genitals to be 
patently offensive." 
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:affiti-effeet cannot dignify or excuse a work that is otherwise 
ently offensive, and a quality condition cannot be engrafted 
,o the Miller test. It should also be noted that the trial 
lgefs ruling here as well as the jury's verdict was based not 
Ly on the rather crude drawings but the words adjacent thereto, 
e commonly understood meaning of which further defined and 
phasized the artist's intent to appeal to the prurient interest. 
As indicated earlier, the Miller test does not require the 
rial judge to determine whether or not the "two key drawings 
ppeal to the prurient interest and are patently offensive" 
penultimate paragraph of Opinion), although the Court of Appeals 
eems prepared to make such a judgment. The threshold duty imposed 
ipon the trial court by Miller and its progeny is to ascertain that 
;here is a reasonable possibility or substantial chance that the 
jury might find the material obscene. Whether a blown-up drawing 
of a vagina in shadings of full color labeled "Tunnel of Love" is 
a sufficiently cogent example of the "lewd exhibition of the 
genitals" referred to in Miller, for example, is certainly 
something the trial judge could properly find to be above the 
threshold without necessarily determining that it was obscene, and 
he did so. Although patent offensiveness and prurient appeal are 
essentially questions of fact in both situations, the Miller test 
was applied by the trial judge to the extent necessary to assure 
constitutional protections, and the full question of obscenity was 
correctly left to the jury. Jenkins v. Georgia. 41 L.Ed.2d at 650, 
is in harmony with the case here; the court found that the facts 
7 
did not meet the Miller threshold for "there is no exhibition of 
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise." 
C. What Constitutes the Whole. To bolster its position in 
finding the Turner materials to be constitutionally protected 
without reference to community standards, the Court of Appeals 
defines the total decor of Turner's shop (three bedsheets) as an 
integrated whole. Superficially, that is effected by labeling 
everything displayed in the shop as a "collage". The trial court 
did indicate that the totality was "like a collage", but it further 
characterized it as "a whole group of unrelated things * * * 
juxtaposed next to one another." Tr., p. 206-7, 1. 25, 1-2. 
More specifically, the lower court applied what it calls the 
"Kois test", based on the opinion in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 
229, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312. Kois was decided before 
Miller, as pointed out by the lower court, and it refers to "the 
dominant theme of the material", a reference coming from the 
earlier cases of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966) . After Miller v. California, supra, that phrase was 
replaced by the word "work". The change, if significant, would be 
to thematically narrow the material focused upon to a single work 
or opus, rather than a collection of material having various 
themes, one of which is dominant. 
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Even if there is no distinction, however, the total assortment 
disparate items on Turner's bedsheets, done at different times 
different people, is not susceptible to conversion into a single 
ole by virtue of the reasoning in Kois. The court in Kois did 
t consider the newspaper called Kaleidoscope to constitute a 
lole. Instead, thematic integration was found within each 
articular article or poetry section. As pointed out by the court 
n Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 
t 1393 (8th Cir. 1985) , "the photo in Kois was placed in the midst 
)f the text and was related to and illustrated the point of the 
article." The comments of Profession Schauer, supra at 108-09, are 
pertinent: 
"[I]t has . . . been suggested that, in general, the 
entire 'physical item,' that is, book, magazine, or other 
item, be looked at as a unit. If the 'physical item1 
test were rigidly applied, however, it would be far too 
easy to include hard-core pornography as one article in 
a magazine also containing excerpts from the writings of 
D. H. Lawrence or James Joyce. It would be more 
appropriate for the court, and the trier of fact, to make 
an evaluation in every instance as to the intended or 
likely 'unit of perception. ' A magazine article, or a 
single book, or a motion picture, are intended to be seen 
or read as a unit, and should therefore be evaluated as 
such. So also when articles or stories are clearly 
inter-related and it is intended and expected that they 
will be perceived as a unit. But magazine 'articles' 
with no connection except that of dealing with the same 
general subject matter are not necessarily likely to be 
seen or read together, and should therefore be evaluated 
separately." 
The totality of drawings and writings here is comparable to a 
newspaper or magazine, and the specific lower portion of one of the 
sheets which deals with a sexual theme can readily be separated 
from the rest, both visually and thematically, to constitute a unit 
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of perception, a whole work in and of itself. The drawings and 
accompanying phrases here have no relationship to the other 
decorations on the bedsheets other than common bad taste. 
Assuming that other elements elsewhere on the bedsheets were 
protected speech, the cases are clear that obscenity is not made 
acceptable by mixing it in with other communications that may be 
acceptable. See the good discussion of this point in United States 
v. Merrill. 746 F.2d 458 at 464 (9th Cir. 1984), where the attempt 
to insert unrelated items into a collage was not allowed. If the 
material in question is not protected speech, its character is not 
changed by surrounding it with protected material unless it is 
thematically related sufficiently to constitute a single, 
integrated communication. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 at 679, it is stated: 
"This Court has held that when 'speech1 and 'nonspeech' 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 
Not every admixture of unrelated items becomes a collage, and there 
is no evidence here to indicate that an attempt was even made to 
unify the diverse elements into a single whole. While Turner 
attempts to characterize the bedsheet containing most of the 
offensive material as "a political statement", he acknowledges that 
other portions "were meant for Halloween" and are in a different 
context. Tr., p. 240, 1. 10-17. As for the primary bedsheet, 
Turner's attempt to bridge "political" and "sexual" is so strained 
as to make it an unlikely base for the holding that there is a 
10 
Lgle theme. See Tr., p. 228, 1. 8-10 where he states: "And that 
>le depiction was supposed to be political in nature, more or 
ss, towards (sic) girls to not be a tramp or a whore." Nearby 
olitical" representations include a swastika, a cross, a skull 
d crossbones, and a numeral "13". There was certainly enough 
Lestion of any possible thematic relationship to justify 
lbmission of that issue to the jury for its determination. 
D. Effect of Accessibility to Youth. Notwithstanding the 
omments of the Court of Appeals in Footnote 5, Petitioner believes 
.'urner's shop was satisfactorily shown to cater to young people, 
mcluding children under 18 years of age, and that this is a factor 
the trial court and jury should be entitled to consider. Not only 
was the shop shown to be outside of a normal commercial area and 
not far from a high school (Tr., p. 158-9, 1. 25, 1-14), but Turner 
admits that his shop attracts high school students (Tr., p. 236, 1. 
6-9) , and there was even a person under 18 present when the 
officers visited his shop (Tr., p. 232, 1. 21-23). The opinion of 
the lower court infers that exposure of the materials to minors is 
only relevant if the Cityfs ordinance provides time, place, or 
manner limitations on the display of materials. Many of the cases, 
however, would allow the presence of children to be taken into 
consideration in determining the threshold for obscenity regardless 
of specific inclusion in a statute or ordinance. In Pinkus v. 
United States. 436 U.S. 293, 98 S.Ct. 1808, 56 L.Ed.2d 293 at 299, 
for example, the court implies that if children are intended 
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recipients or are likely to receive the material in question, that 
fact is a consideration for the trier of fact. In his concurring 
opinion in State v. Haia, 578 P.2d 837 at 843 (Utah, 1978) Judge 
Maughan characterizes Miller v. California, supra, as being 
predicated in part upon the theory that the State's interest in 
prohibiting obscenity should be influenced by a mode of 
dissemination that carries with it a significant danger oi; exposure 
to juveniles. Even the case of Huffman v. United States, supra, at 
405, cited by the Court of Appeals, acknowledges that the absence 
of any claim of the distribution of the materials in question to 
young people was a factor in its decision. 
The shop's dependence upon neighbors in the area as shown by 
the absence of a sign, and the fact that it is open only during 
hours when the youth of the area are not in school, both support 
the probability of high exposure to youthful patrons. The method 
of disseminating the material, of course, is calculated to readily 
confront anyone entering the store, regardless of age. Justice 
Stevens, concurring in Carey v. Population Services Intern., 97 
S.Ct. 2010 at 2033 (1977), would probably agree that display of 
material in a manner and place likely to bring it to the attention 
of minors is a factor for consideration: 
"A picture which may appropriately be included in an 
instruction book may be excluded from a billboard.11 
The accessibility of the hanging bedsheets to young members of the 
public can properly have been considered by the trial court. 
12 
2. By redefining the standard to be used by the trial judge 
his preliminary evaluation for assurance that constitutional 
larantees are protected, the Court of Appeals has exceeded the 
ireshold requirements of Miller v. California, supra, and expanded 
:s review into areas that should be left to the trier of fact for 
pplication of community standards. The trial judge adequately 
easured the nature and quantum of evidence in light of the Miller 
.est, and the Court of Appeals should not overturn his ruling in 
:hat regard without a showing that it was clearly erroneous. 
3ecause of the advantaged position of the trial court who has the 
duty and prerogative of making the initial review discussed herein, 
an appellate court should reverse that court's determination only 
upon a showing that it is clearly in error or that there was an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah, 1980). 
Application of the community standard is a jury function (e.g., 
Hamlina v. United States, 41 L.Ed.2d at 613), and the pertinent 
threshold should only require the prosecution to clear a crossbar 
comprised of that minimum showing of facts as will suffice to 
protect the important constitutional right of free expression. 
At bottom, the Court of Appeal's reversal appears to 
misapprehend the fundamental nature of the appropriate inquiry 
required by Miller v. California, supra. Moreover, adoption of the 
position taken in its opinion would prevent a jury, as fact finder, 
from applying the standards of its community until after the trial 
judge had exercised his judgment with regard to substantially the 
same totality of facts. The sensitive issue of standards in a 
13 
particular community should not be infringed upon once the court's 
initial constitutional review shows that it may be possible for 
obscenity to exist. Safeguarding the traditional role of a jury as 
determiner of local standards in these cases transcends 
adjudicative fact finding and must be carefully observed whenever 
basic constitutional protections are otherwise present to a minimum 
degree. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. 
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GARFF, Judge: 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant, Brent Allen Turner, appeals his conviction of 
displaying an obscene picture depicting sexual conduct in 
violation of St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2. We reverse. 
FACTS 
Turner operated a retail business in St. George, Utah, 
vending hard rock record albums and T-shirts. Turner's small, 
signless store was open during evening hours only. He was 
charged with violating the St. George obscenity ordinance for 
his display of three painted bed sheets which he used as wall 
hangings and which were visible to anyone entering the shop. 
Several people made their "artistic" contributions to the 
sheets as they hung on the wall. The sheets appear to be a 
$Wa/^T" 
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collage consisting of various drawings and slogans in different 
sizes and styles. The paint appears to have been sprayed or 
brushed on. The pictures and slogans appear crude and 
simplistic. Several factors make some of the slogans and 
drawings impossible to discern from the record: the quality of 
the photographs in the exhibit, the draping of the sheets, and 
the fact that some stereo speakers appear in front of the 
sheets in the photographs. The slogans and drawings appear 
intended to confront and to offend, and are related to sexual, 
political, religious, and social themes. The portion of the 
wall hangings that the prosecution claims violates the St. 
George ordinance supposedly portrays a woman reclining in a 
spread-eagled manner so as to expose her "pubic area," 
represented by three or four black paint spots. The face and 
head of the figure could conceivably be that of a dog. Next to 
the drawing of the woman is what has been represented to be an 
enlarged drawing of a woman's pubic area. Both renditions are 
crudely drawn, blurry and indistinct. The quality of the 
renderings could best be compared to the graffiti and drawings 
frequently found on the walls of a junior high school rest 
room.2 
Turner was charged with violating St. George City 
Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 §§ 2a(l) and (2). The relevant 
portions of this lengthy ordinance are as follows: 
No person shall knowingly: (1) Distribute, 
display publicly, furnish or provide to 
any person any obscene material or 
performance. 
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § 2a(l). "Obscene- is 
defined as 
1. The slogans include "Nuke My Ass," "Your [sic] Afraid Face 
it," "Group Sex," "Total Peace," "Fuck Authority," "Burn the 
Dead," "Eat It," "Live-Die Airborne," "Hell House," "Kill for 
God," "Run and Hide Death Will Find You!," "Sold Your Soul," 
"White Flys [sic] Will Eat Your Flesh," "The End," "And Unto 
You I Dedicate My Heart,- and -My Right to The World.- The 
drawings include a peace symbol, an MX missile, a swastika, 
some gravestones, some crosses, some international prohibitive 
symbols over the words "life" and -drugs,- a smiling face, a 
gun, several skulls, some with cross bones, some with full 
skeletons, a door, a mushroom cloud, and a moon. 
2* The dissent's description of the two drawings gives the 
impression one is looking at an explicit medical illustration 
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any material or performance which, when 
taken as a whole and considered in the 
context of the contemporary standards of 
this community: 
(1) Appeals to prurient interest in sex; 
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive manner; 
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 
»t. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § la. The ordinance 
provides a lengthy definition of "sexual conduct," the relevant 
portion of which is as follows: 
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory 
function or lewd exhibition of the 
genitals, including any explicit close-up 
representation of a human genital organ or 
a spread eagle exposure of female genital 
organs. 
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le (emphasis added). 
A jury found Turner guilty. He now appeals his 
conviction on the grounds that (1) the obscenity ordinance was 
unconstitutional as applied to him, and (2) the ordinance is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
(Footnote 2 continued) 
from Gray's Anatomy, or viewing an exact photograph of the area 
in question, leaving no room for dispute as to what the 
renditions depict. Such is simply not the case. The second 
drawing, described in such intimate detail, could just as 
easily be viewed as a beetle, a leaf, or a Zulu war shield. Or 
it might more closely resemble a fugitive ink blot from the 
Rorschach test ("A personality and intelligence test in which a 
subject interprets ten standard black or colored inkblot 
designs and reveals through his selectivity the manner in which 
intellectual and emotional factors are integrated in his 
perception of environmental stimuli." Webster's Medical Desk 
Dictionary (1986)). Because the drawings were sufficiently 
abstract so as to permit a variety of nonobscene 
interpretations, and because of the other reasons enumerated 
later in this opinion, the judge, as a matter of law, should 
have never permitted the issue to go to the jury. 
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FIRST AMENDMENT 
In a case where we are required to weigh important first 
amendment values of freedom of speech against a charge of 
obscenity based on a statute or ordinance that is properly 
limited, we exercise independent review when necessary, and 
determine, as a matter of constitutional law, whether the 
material is to be protected. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 
160 (1974).3 
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United 
States Supreme Court set forth its definition of obscenity. 
The standard has been elaborated in subsequent cases,4 and it 
remains the standard for distinguishing between speech, which 
is protected by the first amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and obscenity, which is not considered speech and 
receives no such protection. I£. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I 
v, Slaton. 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 485 (1957).5 
3. "[T]he First Amendment values applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by 
the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an 
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." 
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). See also, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163-64 
(Brennan, J. concurring). 
4. For example, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 
491 (1985) (elaboration of prurient interest); and Jenkins, 418 
U.S. 153 (elaboration of community standards). 
5. The prosecution argues that, because the record shop is 
near a school and because minors are likely to frequent the 
shop, we should apply the lower standard suggested in Erznoznik 
v. Citv of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (discussing 
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations of speech). 
However, the St. George ordinance fails to regulate the time, 
place, or manner that sexually explicit material may be 
displayed, but instead, it places a content-based restriction 
on any display of sexually explicit material. Consequently, we 
must apply the stricter test set forth in Miller, 413 U.S. 15* 
Additionally, because the shop is unmarked and is only open 
evenings, when school is not in session, it does not appear 
that minors are especially likely to frequent the shop. 
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The Miller test is as follows: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of 
fact must be: (a) whether the average 
person, applying contemporary community 
standards would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
413 U.S. at 24 (quotations and citations omitted). The Miller 
test is basically incorporated into the St. George ordinance, 
except that the ordinance defines "sexual conduct" in ways not 
specifically mentioned in Miller. Specifically, the St. George 
ordinance prohibits the display of "any explicit close-up 
representation of . . . a spread eagle exposure of female 
genital organs." St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le. 
However, among the "plain examples" given by the Miller court 
as to what a statute or ordinance can define for regulation as 
patently offensive sexual conduct was the "lewd exhibition of 
the genitals." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. We find that, insofar 
as the definition describes materials that "depict or describe 
patently offensive 'hard core* sexual conduct" and insofar as 
that sexual conduct passes muster under the Miller test, which 
it must under section 1(a) of the ordinance, the ordinance is 
within constitutional limits.6 Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 27). 
PRURIENT INTEREST AND 
PATENTLY OFFENSIVE 
The first prong of the Miller analysis requires the trier 
of fact to determine whether the "'average person, applying 
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Miller v. 
California/ 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United 
States. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). 
6. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not consider 
whether the depiction at issue is lewd. 
5 
Material that appeals to the prurient interest does not 
include "material that provpke[s] only normal, healthy sexual 
desires." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 498 
(1985). Rather, it applies to material that provokes "sexual 
responses over and beyond those that would be characterized as 
normal." ££[• Specifically, "prurience may be constitutionally 
defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which 
appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex . . . ." Id. 
at 504. 
The second prong of the Miller analysis is "whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law." 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
When determining what appeals to the prurient interest 
and what is patently offensive, the jury is not allowed 
unbridled discretion. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 
(1974). The trial judge has a significant role in defining the 
extent of the jury's discretion. "Application of the obscenity 
standard involves a subjective element on the part of the 
tribunal—judge, jury or both—making the critical 
determination." Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 397 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974)), In addition, jury discretion is subject to 
independent appellate review, when necessary, and by the 
requirement that only depictions of patently offensive hard 
core sexual conduct be subject to prosecution. Jenkins, 418 
U.S. at 160. Therefore, in Jenkins, the Supreme Court did not 
hesitate to invade the province of the jury, which the Georgia 
Supreme Court had refused to do. In overturning the verdict, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the jury did not have sole 
discretion to determine that the film Carnal Knowledge was 
obscene, and substituted its judgment for that of the jury 
because, it concluded, it was "simply not the 'public portrayal 
of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the 
ensuing commercial gain1 which we said was punishable in 
Miller." 418 U.S. at 162 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 35). 
Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of "hard-coreness" 
that must be met. 
Not only must the statute or ordinance be 
constitutionally explicit, but the trial court has the 
responsibility to make a threshold determination as to whether 
a work may depict hard-core sexual conduct. Only after the 
court has reached this conclusion is it appropriate to turn the 
matter over to the jury to apply the first two prongs of the 
890620-CA 6 
liller test. Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court 
:orrectly made the threshold determination contemplated in 
fenkins. ° The court, in its pretrial order denying a motion to 
lismiss, found that "the words and drawing described herein 
7. In a recent case, State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 
(1991), the Utah Supreme Court commented on the distinctions 
between the overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury. 
Even though Ramirez was concerned with the admission of 
eyewitness identification, we f:nd the court's comments 
appropriate here where the trial court has to make a 
preliminary determination of obscenity when that same issue 
will have to be redetermined by the jury when the evidence is 
considered: 
Potential for role confusion and for 
erosion of constitutional guarantees 
inheres in this overlap of responsibility 
of judge and jury to determine the same 
issue. Because the jury is not bound by 
the judge's preliminary factual 
determination made in ruling on 
admissibilityt/obscenityj the trial court 
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as 
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize 
proffered evidence for constitutional 
defects and may simply admit the evidence, 
leaving all questions pertinent to its 
reliability[/obscenity] to the jury. But 
courts cannot properly sidestep their 
responsibility to perform the required 
constitutional admissibility[/obscenity] 
analysis. To do so would leave protection 
of constitutional rights to the whim of a 
jury and would abandon the courts' 
responsibility to apply the law. 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. 
8. "Judges . . • must take care lest they decide these cases 
on the basis simply of their indignation and disgust with the 
kind of trash presented. The First Amendment extends to trash, 
if it stops short of obscenity . . . ." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 
396. Even though a piece may be "dismally unpleasant, uncouth 
and tawdry," that alone "is not enough to make [it] 
•obscene.fW Manual Enter, v. Dav. 370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962). 
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arguably suggest an act which would constitute a violation of 
the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital contact." 
While the spray painted drawings depict representations 
of genitalia, the drawings are too crudely rendered to be 
salacious or titillating or to provoke sezual responses, normal 
or healthy, much less those that are "over and beyond those 
that would be characterized as normal," Brockett, 472 U.S. at 
498. "Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the 
States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such 
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The arresting officer 
admitted as much at trial. Even though the drawings are 
vulgar, offensive, and confrontational, they are too sketchy 
and abstract to appeal "to a shameful or morbid interest in 
sex." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.9 The trial court's pretrial 
finding of an "arguable suggestion" is not sufficient to meet 
the constitutional test, and our own review of the evidence 
leads us to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, these 
renderings are not "public portrayal[s] of hard-core sexual 
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial 
gain." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 
35) . 
Moreover, we cannot judge the drawings in isolation, but 
must also consider the written material and other symbols 
because Miller requires us to view the collage "taken as a 
whole" in determining its appeal to the prurient interest. 413 
U.S. at 24. In Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972),10 the 
9. "The First Amendment protection for the depiction of nude 
women applies even . . . where the pictures focus upon the 
pubic areas and poses are struck in such a way as to emphasize 
the female genitalia." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 401. 
10. Although Kois preceded Miller, Miller frequently cites the 
case with approval, indicating an intent to reaffirm the 
decision and its analysis. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23, 24, 25, 26, 
35, 37, Also, the test in Kois was whether "to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient 
interest." Kois, 408 U.S. at 230 (quoting Roth v. United 
States. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). Although this phrase 
implies that the Kois phrase "taken as a whole" applies only to 
the first part of the Miller test, the crux of Kois was whether 
an allegedly obscene depiction had political value. We think 
the Kois analysis of "taken as a whole" is helpful in both the 
first and third prongs of the Miller test. 
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upreme Court considered the context in which an allegedly 
bscene work was displayed.. Kois_ involved the publication of a 
»hotograph of an embracing nude couple, similar to one 
:onfiscated by a Wisconsin district attorney. Because the 
iccompanying article was about the confiscation, the Court held 
zhat the picture was newsworthy and thus protected. Laying a 
[foundation for what would later be the third prong of the 
filler analysis, the Court held that context could redeem an 
otherwise obscene picture, where there is some contextual 
relativity between the offending portion and the rest of the 
work: "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will 
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication." 
408 U.S. at 231. The Court held that because the picture was 
"rationally related" and "relevant to the theme of the 
article," it was "clearly entitled" to protection. Id. 
Here, the two drawings do not appear as a sham attempt to 
insulate obscene material with protected material. That is, 
while the two drawings may be more confrontational and vulgar 
than what appears on the rest of the bedsheets, they are not 
entirely out of context with the other depictions of political, 
philosophical, musical, social and sexual themes. Because the 
work is a collage, there is not a close relationship among all 
the slogans and symbols. However, a close relationship is not 
the requirement; a rational relationship is. Kois, 407 U.S. at 
231.X1 
The two drawings meet the Kois test because they 
rationally relate to the immediate context (the wall hangings) 
and to the broader context (the record store). The immediate 
context is a collage of various symbols and phrases. The 
broader context is that of a hard rock record store which vends 
heavy metal music, which music is intended, in part, to 
challenge traditional ideas and modes of thinking. 
Therefore, even if we were to concede, which we do not, 
that the two key drawings appeal to the prurient interest and 
are patently offensive, we cannot see how the entire collage, 
taken as a whole, is so. 
11. The jCois Court's use of the phrase "rationally related" 
suggests a low level of integration between an offending 
picture and its larger context. gee E. Main, The Neglected 
Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary, 
Artistic. Political, or Scientific Value. 11 S. Ill- Univ. L.J. 
1159, 1163-64 (1987). 
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Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
drawings themselves do not,.appeal to the prurient interest and 
are not patently offensive, "and because the drawings rationally 
relate to the rest of the collage, which, taken as a whole, is 
not patently offensive and does not appeal to the prurient 
interest, we find that the drawings are not in violation of the 
St- George ordinance. 
fte therefore reverse e conviction, 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge. /• 
I CONCUR: 
* w 
Gregor^K. Orrae, Judge 
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ACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
INTRODUCTION 
I would affirm Mr, Turner's conviction. He was tried by a 
jury of his peers and found guilty of violating an ordinance 
tfhich specifically defined constitutionally obscene materials, 
^r. Turner was provided fair notice that lewd exhibition of 
human genitals to the St. George public, including spread-eagle 
exposure of female genital organs, would bring prosecution. 
Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) provides "plain 
examples of what a state statute [or city ordinance] could 
define [as obscenity] for regulation . . . ." One of Miller* s 
plain examples of "hard core" sexual conduct is representation 
of "lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id- Thus, the trial 
judge could reasonably determine that the ordinance contained a 
constitutionally proper and specific definition of obscenity 
and that Turner's exhibition of the nude spread-eagle female 
and a separate enlarged detailed vulva with open vagina, 
exposed labia and clitoris was in violation of the 
constitutionally valid ordinance. Accordingly, the trial judge 
properly submitted the case to the jury for determination after 
denying a pretrial motion to dismiss based only on submission 
of Turner's drawings and the city ordinance. The jury saw the 
materials, heard the evidence and determined that Turner's 
materials were obscene and that he had displayed them to 
unwarned members of the public in violation of the city 
ordinance.^ 
FACTS 
The statement of "facts" in the main opinion reads like a 
subjective treatise in art appreciation, assessing the quality 
of Turner's art work as "crude," "simplistic," "abstract," 
"indistinct" and "blurry." However, this attack of adjectives 
is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has not indicated that 
tasteful, mature, high quality obscenity should be suppressed 
or that untasteful, immature, low quality obscenity should go 
without regulation. On the other hand, the opinion does 
recognize that the "indistinct" drawing is in fact "a woman 
reclining in a spread-eagled manner (facing the viewer) so as 
to expose her pubic area." The opinion also recognizes the 
1. Since Turner accepted the jury instructions "as 
constituted," no exceptions, I must conclude that the jury was 
properly instructed regarding applicable law. 
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drawing next to the woman as a large depiction of a woman's 
pubic area but evaluates it^as "blurry." These observations 
are highly relevant. This "blurry" drawing (in shades of red 
and pink) graphically depicts all of the external female 
genitalia. This vulva is surrounded by depictions of pubic 
hair done in black. "Genitalia," the word in Miller and the 
St. George ordinance, means the reproductive organs, especially 
the external sex organs. The American Heritage Dictionary, 
Second College Edition 553 (1985). Despite the majority's 
protestation in footnote 2 that Turner's depictions might 
resemble something else, Turner testified that they were a nude 
woman and an enlargement of a "girl's vagina." 
Turner's vulva depiction occupies the center of the sheet 
(side to side) with the top of the vulva at the center of the 
sheet (top to bottom). On the lower half of the sheet, the 
left third is occupied by the words of a question with the nude 
woman underneath. The question done in black over yellow is: 
"Why Not Let 
Some One Else 
Think For You?" 
The upper half of the vulva and pubic hair depiction is 
immediately to the right of the three lines in the question. 
Between the question and the nude woman is: "Tuna Factory x x 
x x" inscribed in a green banner over her head. Between the 
nude woman and the vulva is a small sign post with the words 
"Tunnel of Love" and a yellow arrow points from the sign to the 
lower half of the vulva and pubic hair. Underneath the vulva 
and hair are the words "Keep Out" in red. To the right of the 




The upper half of the sheet has these slogans across the top 
(left to right): "My Right to the World," "Your (sic) Afraid 
Face If and "Live For Yourself" and a round bomb with "Drugs" 
inscribed on it. Underneath these items and across the lower 
portion of the upper half (left to right) are a skull, a 
swastika, a "13," a happy face, and a shield with "AA" on it. 
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The majority disposes of the jury's verdict by virtue of a 
"hard core" attack (without defining hard core) and by use 
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a "loose" definition of the scope of appellate review in 
unting the attack. Their opinion, citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 
8 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), states that "the jury is not allowed 
ibridled discretion" in making its obscenity determination, 
ten the majority claims that Jenkins demonstrates that the 
>pellate court should "not hesitate to invade the province of 
le jury" and to "substitute its judgment" for the jury's 
idgment because the jury "does not have sole discretion" to 
ake the obscenity determination. I will first discuss scope 
f appellate review and then address the meaning of "hard core" 
nd the "average person test" in response to the above 
osturing of the main opinion. Later in my opinion I will 
each the main opinion's backup position regarding the context 
f Turner's work taken "as a whole." 
I agree that the jury does not have unbridled discretion 
.n an obscenity case. But I also note that my appellate 
rolleagues do not have unbridled discretion on review. Our 
function is to restrict both the legal and factual 
determinations to the constitutional guidelines set forth in 
Miller. Miller states that the elements of obscenity—prurient 
interest, patent offensiveness and lack of serious value—are 
to be determined by the trier of fact, i.e., the jury. 413 
U.S. at 26 & n.9; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 
291, 308 (1977). Further, prurient interest and patent 
offensiveness are to be measured by the test of an average 
person in the community applying contemporary community 
standards, which I will discuss in detail below. Thus, we must 
give the jury's findings on those elements a fair measure of 
deference, particularly in a close case. That does not mean 
that obscenity convictions will be virtually unreviewable. 
Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. But, " [determinations of prurient 
interest and patent offensiveness, and also, therefore, of 
contemporary community standards, are such as to indicate that 
the major determination should be made by the jury, except in 
the more extreme cases." F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity at 
150-51 (1976)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter Schauer]. Since 
the serious value element is to be measured by a "reasonable 
person" standard, this determination is more amenable to 
appellate review. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. 
[I]t is also significant to note the 
further indication of this decision 
rHamlinq v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 
(1974)] that although all of the elements 
of the Supreme Court's obscenity tests 
have a constitutional basis, only the 
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[serious] value standard is really a 
question of fundamental constitutional 
rights- The other tests are mainly 
questions of fact requiring a less rigid 
standard of review, 
Schauer at 125 (emphasis added). 
Because the majority fails to recognize the proper scope of 
appellate review, it answers the wrong question. Thus, the 
analysis quickly adopts a finding that Turner's "renderings are 
not public portrayals of hard core sexual conduct", i.e., the 
renderings are not obscene. Our function is not to answer the 
question of whether Turner's materials are obscene—as the 
majority has done. Our function is to answer the question of 
whether Turner's materials created a jury question as to 
obscenity—as the majority has not done. 
The appellate court should review each Miller element and 
determine as to that element whether a jury issue has been 
created. Instead, the majority disposes of the jury's obscenity 
verdict by exercise of their own "hard core" judgment. 
A. The "Hard Core" Judgment 
In Huffman, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit correctly observed that prior to 1971, the United States 
Supreme Court had not defined the term "hard core" 
pornography.2 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.9 
(1971) rev'd, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court 
did not define "hard core" until 1973 in Miller which set forth 
specific examples. If material which has failed to pass the 
Miller tests for obscenity looks like something different than 
Miller's examples, then the jury or trial judge has erred in 
application of at least one of the tests. Schauer at 113. The 
main opinion relies on Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162 
(1974) as the basis of its obscenity determination, holding that 
Turner's drawings do not depict "hard core" sexual conduct. But 
2. The main opinion relies on Huffman, a pre-Miller and 
pre-Jenkins circuit case for language to support its "hard core" 
pornography argument. See nn. 7 & 8. Further, the opinion 
utilizes Huffman to support its scope of review position. 
890620-CA 14 
le opinion fails to examine the meaning of "hard core."J Thus, 
*fore examining our case in the light of Jenkins, I turn to 
iller for the definitive "meaning of "hard core." 
Miller states "for the first time since Roth \v. United 
tates, 354 U.S. 476] was decided in 1957, a majority of this 
ourt has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core' 
ornography from expression protected by the First Amendment." 
iiller, 413 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). The Miller guidelines 
.nclude concrete examples of "hard core" materials. .One of 
:hose examples is "lewd exhibition of the genitals." i£L at 
25. This example isolates as "hard core" the very materials 
described in the St. George ordinance and exhibited by Turner. 
His depictions and descriptions consist of genital imagery and 
sexual conduct. Since Miller, the depiction of sexual conduct 
does not necessarily require motion or activity. Jenkins 
3. Miller states that under its holding "no one will be subject 
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials 
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 
'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
regulating state law. . . ." Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. "Depict" 
means to present a lifelike image of. Roaet's II, The New 
Thesaurus 246 (1980). "Describe" means to give a verbal account 
of. LQU at 250. Thus, "hard core" sexual conduct can be 
presented in images or words. 
4. Professor Schauer has stated: 
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court 
specifically stated that only the 
depiction of "hard-core" sexual conduct 
may be prohibited. As examples of what 
might be included, the Court indicated the 
following: 
(a) Patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated. 
(b) Patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of 
masturbation, excretory functions, 
and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 
This definition seems to make it clear 
that hard-core pornography may include 
things other than actual sexual congress 
or activity, contrary to the views of a 
15 
states that "we made it plain that under that holding [Miller] 
'no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure 
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe 
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct . . . .'" 
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added)(quoting Miller, 413 
U.S. at 27). 
Jenkins reiterates the following definitions of "hard core,f 
as first set forth in Miller: 
We also took pains in Miller to 
"give a few plain examples of what a state 
statute could define for regulation under 
part (b) of the standard announced," that 
is, the requirement of patent 
offensiveness. id., at 25, 93 S.Ct., at 
2615. These examples include 
"representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated," and "representations 
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd exhibition of the 
genitals." Ibid. While this did not 
purport to be an exhaustive catalog of 
what juries might find patently offensive, 
it was certainly intended to fix 
substantive constitutional limitations, 
deriving from the First Amendment, on the 
type of material subject to such a 
determination. It would be wholly at odds 
with this aspect of Miller to uphold an 
obscenity conviction based upon a 
defendant's depiction of a woman with a 
bare midriff, even though a properly 
charged jury unanimously agreed on a 
verdict of guilty. 
(Footnote 4 continued) 
number of other courts prior to Miller. 
These views seemed based primarily on the 
SsdlUBL [v, New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)] 
reversals of the Supreme Court, since for 
a number of years after 1967 the Court 
reversed any obscenity conviction where 
the material did not display actual sexual 
activity, regardless of the lewd or 
suggestive poses of individual models. 
Schauer at 111. 
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fenkins, 418 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added). Jenkins was a 
'bare midriff" case. Our case is not. Miller does not mention 
Dare midriffs or mere nudity. Miller specifically defines lewd 
axhibition of the "genitals." This is our case. In Jenkins 
the Supreme Court viewed the film Carnal Knowledge and observed: 
While the subject matter of the picture 
is, in a broader sense, sex, and there are 
scenes in which sexual conduct including 
"ultimate sexual acts" is to be understood 
to be taking place, the camera does not 
focus on the bodies of the actors at such 
times. There is no exhibition whatever of 
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, 
during these scenes. There are occasional 
scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not 
enough to make material legally obscene 
under the Miller standards. 
Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
Having observed that the film depicted "nudity" only and 
not "genitals", the Supreme Court held that "the film could 
not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. . . . " I£. at 
161. Jenkins and Miller both tell us what can be defined as 
"hard core," i.e./ lewd exhibition of the genitals. Jenkins 
tells us one thing that can not be considered "hard core," 
i.e., a bare midriff. Jenkins simply does not grant my 
colleagues discretion on review to hold as a matter of 
constitutional law that Turner's depictions and exhibition of 
female genitalia were clearly not obscene and did not create an 
issue for the jury. To the contrary, Jenkins and Miller stand 
for the proposition that St. George could define, and prohibit 
as "hard core" obscenity, the lewd exhibition of the 
genitals—even if only by "representation." Miller, 413 U.S. 
at 25. The St. George ordinance adopted the Miller 
definition. Professor Schauer has stated: 
But now, after Miller, it is clear that 
hard-core pornography may include material 
which does not depict sexual acts, and 
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" is 
specifically included. This should be 
interpreted in the light of a number of 
lower court cases defining hard-core 
pornography to include photographs which 
focus on, exaggerate, or emphasize the 
17 
genitalia or "erogenous zones." It is 
this exaggeration or "highlight" on the 
genitalia which often distinguishes 
hard-core pornography from mere nudity. 
Schauer at 111-112, 
Turner elected to exhibit materials which highlight and 
amplify female genitalia, one of Miller's specific examples of 
"hard core." In fact, Turner described the vulva drawing as: 
"It's supposed to be a very-enlarged portion of the girl's 
pubic area" and the "tunnel of love" represents "a girl's 
vagina." Turner's depictions are a form of hard core 
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed 
depictions set forth in Miller and the St. George ordinance. 
Accordingly, Turner's materials were sufficient to clearly 
present a jury issue as to obscenity. As promised, I now turn 
to further consideration of the average person test because the 
majority has not given proper deference to this test and has 
substituted their own personal judgments for that of the jury. 
B. The Average Person Test 
1. Test Applies to Prurient Interest and Patently Offensive 
Elements 
In 1957, Roth replaced the "most susceptible" person test 
of obscenity with the "average person" test. Miller reaffirmed 
this test by reciting Roth: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact 
must be: (a) whether "the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards" 
would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest. 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489). 
The Miller Court rejected a national "community standard" 
as an exercise in futility. In so doing, the Court relied on 
the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184 (1964) which stated: 
It is neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound to read the First 
Amendment as requiring that the people of 
Maine or Mississippi accept public 
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depiction of conduct found tolerable in 
Las Vegas, or New York City, People in 
different States vary in their tastes and 
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be 
strangled by the absolutism of imposed 
uniformity. 
Tacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted). 
In accord with the above rationale, the Miller Court held 
"that obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary 
community standards', 'not national standards'." Miller, 413 
U.S. at 31-32. Miller analyzed this new standard in relation 
to both the prurient interest and the patent offensiveness 
tests. Both of those tests require a less rigid standard of 
review because they are principally questions of fact. The 
jurors are to apply this standard as would the average person 
in their community. Accordingly, the jurors' analytical 
process is as follows: (1) determine, from their own knowledge 
of the community, the sense of the average person in the 
community; (2) determine from their own knowledge of the 
community contemporary community standards; (3) apply those 
standards to the work in question and make judgments regarding 
appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness. If 
these judgments by the jury are in the affirmative, the work is 
obscene. If either of these judgments is in the negative, the 
work is not obscene. Thus, only the serious value element of 
Miller presents a question regarding fundamental constitutional 
rights. See, e.g. , Schauer at 125. If the work is obscene, 
the jury then determines whether it has serious value which 
would save it. This is done by applying the reasonable person 
test. Pone v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
2s The Average Person 
Who is the mysterious average person? He or she is 
neither the most immune nor the most susceptible. "[0]bscenity 
is to be judged according to the average person in the 
community, rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant• " 
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977). The Miller 
opinion stated the primary concern in requiring a jury to apply 
this standard is that the material "will be judged by its 
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly 
susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally 
insensitive one." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. I note the 
continuing emphasis that it is the individual juror who must 
divine the standards of the average person in the local 
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community* Because this factual judgment is to be exercised by 
the peer juror, the prosecution need not produce "expert" 
witnesses to testify as to obscenity. Kaplan v. California, 
413 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1973). The juror knows as well as any 
expert who the average person is and what the contemporary 
community standards are. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slafcon. 
413 U-S. 49, 56 (1973). The Supreme Court has stated: 
A juror is entitled to draw on his own 
knowledge of the views of the average 
person in the community or vicinage from 
which he comes for making the required 
determination, just as he is entitled to 
draw on his knowledge of the propensities 
of a "reasonable" person in other areas of 
the law. 
Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974), quoted in 
Smith, 431 U.S. at 302. 
This standard requires each juror to tap his or her 
knowledge of his or her community in deciding what obscenity 
conclusion the average person in the community, applying 
contemporary community standards, would reach in a particular 
case. Thus, the appellate judge has a formidable, if not 
impossible task, in second guessing the juror's personal draw 
on his or her "knowledge of the community." How does the 
appellate judge divine the sense of the average person in a 
distant community where the appellate judge does not reside or 
has little, if any, personal knowledge of community mores on 
which to draw? Expert witnesses? Not required. "[I]n 'the 
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since 
Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves 
for the determination of the question.'" Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 
122 (quoting Ginzburq v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 
(1966)). How about the local statute? Introduced here. 
Helpful evidence, but not conclusive. H[T]he local statute on 
obscenity provides relevant evidence of .the mores of the 
community who.se legislative body enacted the law." Smith., 431 
U.S. at 308. Smith held, as did Miller, that the issues of 
prurient interest and patent offensiveness "are fact questions 
for the jury, to be judged in the light of the jurors' 
understanding of contemporary community standards." let., at 
300-01. Thus, we see that the jury is uniquely qualified to 
exercise this particular judgment, i.e., the average person 
applying contemporary community standards. They must "consider 
the entire community and not simply their own subjective 
reactions or the reactions, of a sensitive or of a callous 
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inority." Id. at 305, And in this case, my appellate 
olleagues have little evidence of local community standards 
ther than the juror's judgment which has been exercised, 
ere, the basic evidence of community mores was each juror's 
ersonal knowledge of local standards and the St. George 
rdinance. The St. George ordinance contains the Miller 
efinitions of hard core obscenity- The ordinance is 
ubstantial evidence of a community standard that genitalia 
'ill not be lewdly depicted and displayed to the public. 
'urner elected to exhibit genitalia, as proscribed, to the 
tnwarned members of the public including juveniles who entered 
lis place of business. His public exhibition of hard core 
laterials created questions for the jury regarding prurient 
interest and patent offensiveness. The jury applied the 
'average person" test under contemporary community standards 
and found in the affirmative. Again, the majority has not 
definitively answered the question of whether a jury question 
had been created on these issues. Instead, the majority, 
without acknowledging the "average person" test simply 
substitutes their individual judgments for the judgments 
exercised by the jury and summarily announce their own factual 
findings (dressed up as conclusions of law) in the negative 
stating: 
Because we conclude . . . that the 
drawings themselves do not appeal to the 
prurient interest and are not patently 
offensive and because the drawings 
rationally relate to the rest of the 
collage . . . taken as a whole . . . we 
find the drawings are not in violation of 
the St. George Ordinance. 
TURNER'S WORK "AS A WHOLE" 
Since the majority concluded that Turner's work failed the 
"hard core" requirement, that should have been the end of the 
5. The defense called four witnesses ostensibly to testify 
regarding community standards. One had purchased some "mens,w 
magazines at some convenience stores in Washington County. 
Another had seen "R" rated movies in St. George, including Sea 
of Love and Skin Deep, but no "X" rated movies. One indicated 
that there were literary works available in Southern Utah which 
contained the "F" word, and the last described the place of 
nudes in 20th century art. None testified as "experts" nor 
stated "expert opinions" regarding community standards. 
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opinion, as in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) on which 
they rely. Nevertheless, ttie opinion tries to further save the 
work from the jury's obscenity determination by analyzing 
Turner's work "as a whole."6 
A. Context or Unit of Perception 
Obscenity cases have dealt with a book, a movie, a 
magazine article, a cartoon, a brochure, each as a unit of 
perception.7 What material displayed by Turner is the logical 
6. The majority tries to save Turner's work from the jury's 
obscenity determination by relying completely on the curious 
per curiam case of Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) for 
its "as a whole" analysis. I observe some problems with this 
reliance on Kois. 
First, Kois was a pre-Miller case. Kois is divided into 
two sections using different analyses to dispose of two 
separate criminal offenses: (1) an underground newspaper 
article which included a photo of a nude couple embracing and 
(2) a book of poems which included a poem describing sexual 
intercourse. 
Second, since Kois was a pre-Miller, "national" community 
standards case, the Supreme Court's scope of review was broader 
than it would be post-Miller, applying "local" community 
standards. 
Third, Miller requires a different analytical approach 
than was applied in the sex poem section of Kois. There, the 
Court looked at the "artistic" value of the poem in question 
and considered it to be in the realm of "serious art." From 
that premise, the Court decided the dominant theme of the poem 
did not appeal to the prurient interest. Under Miller "serious 
value" of the work is examined last and only after the work has 
failed the prurient interest and patent offensiveness tests. 
If so, "serious value" is examined to determine if the work has 
value which can save it. 
7. The trial judge, the jurors and the appellate judges should 
observe the complete "work" as a unit of perception. See 
generally Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (book); 
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (movie); Penthouse 
Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert-
dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980) (magazine); Paoish v. Board of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam) (political cartoon); 
Hamlina v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1984) (advertising 
brochure). 
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nit of perception? The prosecution offered two separate 
heets as units of perception each depicting offensive 
aterial. Turner testified that one of the sheets which 
ontained, among other slogans and depictions, the words "Group 
ex" and "Eat It, Eat Me" was prepared four years earlier as 
art of a Halloween motif. Accordingly, it did not bear any 
ime relation or context relation to the other sheet depicting 
he nude and vulva. Further, Turner's counsel argued to the 
rial court that the two sheets were "totally" separate and 
lifferent works. The main opinion disregards Turner's view and 
.dentifies Turner's "hard rock record store," including the 
'collage" of wall hangings, as the unit of perception. I agree 
/ith Turner and his counsel that the logical unit of perception 
*s to view each of Turner's sheets as separate "paintings" or 
*orks. Turner's painting (sheet depicting the nude female and 
/ulva), described in detail in my "facts" section above, is the 
tfork or unit of perception at issue in this case. Thus, the 
single sheet is the "work" to be "taken as a whole" in the 
analysis. 
B. Dominant Theme 
The question to be asked by trial judge, jury and 
appellate judge is: 
whether the objectionable materials are 
related to text or other materials which 
are themselves constitutionally protected, 
or whether the text [or other materials 
are] merely asserted as a sham to attempt 
to shield commercial pornography in a 
cloak of legitimacy. 
Schauer at 106. 
Turner was unable to articulate any text or theme for the 
materials on his painting exclusive of the nude and vulva. His 
testimony reveals that he had no clear theme. He was not sure, 
but he believed his painting "resembles political commentary." 
Even Turner's brief concedes that the theme of his "bed sheets 
is admittedly difficult to identify precisely." Thus, the 
jury, applying the "average person test" could reasonably 
conclude that the objectionable sexual depictions and 
descriptions could not possibly relate to the other materials 
on the sheet because they were themeless, i.e., a diverse 
collection of ideas. Further, even if the other materials set 
forth a clear "political" theme, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the "sexual" materials had nothing to do with 
politics. Moreover, since Turner testified that the two sexual 
aanfi^ n-fA 23 
depictions were the first materials placed on the sheets (and 
the other materials added later had no theme or were not 
related, if they had a theme), the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that the materials added to the top of the sheet were 
indeed a sham attempt by Turner to insulate or shield obscene 
material (the lower half of the sheet) with non-obscene 
material. Turner could not identify a dominant theme.8 Since 
he could not, the jury had a basis on which to conclude that 
Turner's "themeless" materials were merely a sham attempt to 
insulate his "objectionable" materials. 
Norman H. Jackson, ^ Judge 
8. The majority creates a "rational relationship" among 
Turner's diverse "political, philosophical, musical, social and 
sexual themes" by calling his work a collage. Thus, several 
entirely unrelated themes are made the "dominant theme" of the 
majority with the store as the "context." Accordingly, the 
offensive depictions, as part of the collage, in this large 
context, are simply meaningless, i.e., not obscene. 
This would occur, for example, if the most 
obscene items conceivable were inserted 
between each of the books of the Bible. 
But under existing law, the judges and 
juries are able to identify shams in which 
non-obscene material is used as a vehicle 
to insulate obscene material. As 
established in Ginzburo, the "taken as a 
whole" test is not quantitative. Under 
Miller, even one obscene item contained in 
a work would be sufficient to support a 
finding that the entire publication is 
obscene if, "taken as a whole," the 
publication lacks serious value. The 
"taken as a whole" test is not 
inconsistent with the recognition of shams. 
Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe. 610 F.2d 1353, 1368 (5th 
Cir. 1980)(footnote omitted). 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF ST, GEORGE 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BRENT ALAN TURNER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE 881001374 
The above matter was considered by the court on 
February 27, 1989 in St* George, Utah* present at that hearing 
were Mr. Shumway, Mr. Boyack and the Defendant. The hearing 
was held as a supplement to two prior hearings, to-wit: (1) a 
hearing on February 10, 1989, in open court in*St. George, 
Utah, and (2) a hearing on February 17, 1989 by telephone 
conference, not on the record. All three hearings were held to 
consider Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
During the course of the hearings the Court was 
allowed to view an item of the Cityfs evidence, namely a 
photograph. A machine copy of the photograph is attached to a 
memorandum filed by Mr. Shumway. The photograph shows a 
certain wall-hanging or wall-decoration on display in 
APPENDIX 2 
City of St, George vs. Turner 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 
Case 881001374 - Page 2 
Defendant's place of business on the date when he was charged 
with violating a city ordinance. The wall-hanging appears to 
be a bed sheet on which had been written or drawn certain words 
and pictures. One of the drawings appears to the court to be a 
female person facing the viewer in a reclining, spread-eagle 
position. Although not artfully done, the drawing does show 
genitals. Next to the drawing are the words, "Eat it, eat me". 
The City ordinance in question is in the court file 
and should be a part of the records in this case. 
The Court finds that the words and drawing described 
herein arguably suggest an act which would constitute a 
violation of the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital 
contact. 
The ordinance is constitutional on its face. There 
is a sufficient question of fact as to the existence of 
obscenity to submit the matter to a jury. 
The motion to dismiss is denied. 
The Court recognizes that this ruling, while not 
final, is pivotal in this case. Counsel may wish to ask the 
Utah Court of Appeals for permission to appeal. If such a 
petition is filed and to the extent that it is within the 
Zity,of St. George vs. Turner 
Drder Denying Motion to Dismiss 
:ase 881001374 - Page 3 
Court's power to do so, the court will favorably respond to a 
Motion to Stay Further Proceedings or to such other motion as 
will assist with the appeal process. 
Dated: March 28, 1989 IcyyL^^UMs*--^ 
Circuit Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a full, true and accurate 
copy of the within and foregoing Order Denying Motion to 
Dismiss U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid, this 28th day of March, 
1989 to the following: 
T. M. Shumway, St. George City Attorney, 175 East 
200 North, St. George, Utah (84770) * 
Michael P. zaccheo, Attorney for the Defendant, 50 
South Main Street, Suite #700 of Key Bank Tower, 
P. O. Box #2465, Salt Lake City, Utah (84111) 
Alan D. Boyack, Attorney for Defendant, 205 East 
Tabernacle, P. 0. Box #749, St. George, Utah (84701) 
S 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
APR 2^1389 
t xjot ti'tt Court 
L»wr. Cfcurt of AopeaJt 
irent Alan Turner, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Zity of St. George, 
Respondent, 
ORDER 
DENYING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Court of Appeals No. 890207-CA 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson and Orme (On Law and Motion) . 
The Petition for Interlocutory Appeal is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2Y— day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Richard C. Davidson 
APPENDIX 3 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
BRENT ALAN TURNER, 
Defendant. 
i JUDGMENT 
Case No. 881001374 
The above m a t t e r having come on fo r t r i a l b e f o r e a j u r y on 
D e f e n d a n t B r e n t Alan Turner f s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y t o c h a r g e s of 
v i o l a t i n g S t . George C i t y Ord inance No. 2 - 7 7 - 2 ( O b s c e n i t y ) , t h e 
D e f e n d a n t b e i n g p r e s e n t and r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , Alan Boyack, 
and t h e j u r y h a v i n g heard the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e p a r t i e s , 
and h a v i n g been i n s t r u c t e d by t h e Cour t a s t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e law, 
A v e r d i c t of g u i l t y hav ing been r e n d e r e d by t h e j u r y and 
good c a u s e a p p e a r i n g , Defendant B r e n t Alan Turner i s found and 
ad judged t o be g u i l t y of t h e c h a r g e a g a i n s t him. The Defendan t 
waived h i s r i g h t fo r a s e n t e n c i n g d e l a y , and he i s f i n e d t h e sum 
of $ 3 0 0 . 0 0 . However, t h e D e f e n d a n t e x p r e s s e d an i n t e r e s t i n 
c o n s i d e r i n g an a p p e a l "from t h e v e r d i c t and judgment , and upon h i s 
r e q u e s t , t h e C o u r t s u s p e n d s e x e c u t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c e f o r a 
p e r i o d o f 30 d a y s , and i f a c e r t i f i c a t e of p r o b a b l e c a u s e i s 
r e q u e s t e d w i t h i n t h a t t i m e , t h e C o u r t w i l l e x e c u t e s u c h 
c e r t i f i c a t e and f u r t h e r suspend e x e c u t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c e . 
APPENDIX 4 
D 0 N E a «».« COUKT this 25 th day of September, 1989 
hi David L. Mower 
Circuit Court Judge 
judgment , Brent Alan Turner - Page 2 
